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Abstract 
Devastating forest fires during the summer of 2007 resulted in an unprecedented level of 
destruction in the Mediterranean forests, prompting widespread speculation about profit-
motivated arson as one of the principal causes of the fires. Forest protection laws 
essentially create a scarcity of land, making arson potentially profitable in several ways: 
the clearing of land for development and construction, expansion of farm size, and 
salvage logging (Economist 2007). This study seeks to evaluate the validity of these 
accusations by examining the relationship between land, wheat, and timber prices and 
incidence of forest fires in four countries: Spain, Greece, Italy, and Bulgaria. The fixed 
effects estimation yields mixed results, confirming the existence of a link between profit 
motives and forest fires, but failing to corroborate the arson allegations. 
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I. Introduction 
The summer of 2007 was full of unpleasant surprises for Europe. While Britons 
saw their possessions float away in the immense floods that engulfed them after days of 
unabated torrential rains, Europeans along the Mediterranean directed countless prayers 
for rain toward the heavens as they fought some of the worst forest fires they had ever 
faced. As early as the end of July, the area of Europe’s woodland lost to fires – 337,600 
hectares – had already matched the losses of all of 2006 – 358,500 hectares. Just one 
month later, the total damage had already surpassed that of the previous year, over 80 
people had perished in the flames, and damages in Greece alone were estimated at 3bn 
Euros, or about 0.7% of the country’s GDP (Davidson 2007). Clearly, forest fires are a 
phenomenon of great impact.  
In fact, southern Europeans have always feared droughts, not only for their 
adverse effects on agriculture and water supply, but also for being a harbinger of 
destructive forest fires. In a region where roughly a third of the total land area is covered 
by forest, more than 50,000 fires burn an estimated 600,000 - 800,000 hectares annually. 
This figure represents about 1,5% of total Mediterranean woodlands. The average total 
burnt area in the EU Mediterranean countries – Greece, Italy, Portugal, France, and Spain 
– has quadrupled since the 60’s, largely as a result of land-use changes, socio-economic 
conflicts, and competing interests (WWF 2003). The gravity of these statistics and the 
tragic events of the summer of 2007 merit attention from researchers, policymakers, and 
the general public. (Consult Figure 1 for an illustration of the number of fires per 
Mediterranean country over the last 10 years, paying particular attention to the spike in 
Greece’s data for 2007.) 
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The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that over 95% of forest 
fires in the Mediterranean are human induced (WWF 2003). While this may initially 
seem implausible, the fact that about three-fourths of Europe’s forests have been 
influenced by humans, combined with the absence of certain climatic phenomena such as 
dry storms in the Mediterranean region, lends credibility to the claim. In addition, a large 
fraction of the total number of forest fires remains unexplained, allowing further 
investigation into the causes of woodland fires, which is precisely the intent of this study 
(Alexandrian et al. 1999).  
The forest fires of 2007 prompted an avalanche of accusations in the media, as 
well as on the part of politicians and environmental groups; accusations that were largely 
made possible by the aforementioned ambiguity regarding the causes European forest 
fires. The claim was that most of the fires had been set off by arsonists seeking profit 
through various channels. An article titled, “A combustible mixture: Forest fires in 
Europe”, is only one among many to point toward human activity as a cause of forest 
fires. Undoubtedly, fires started by farmers to burn stubble or clear land can 
unintentionally get out of control, but economically motivated arson, claims the article, 
poses a much more serious challenge to forest protection (The Economist, August 30, 
2007).  
The underlying issue is one of scarcity: since land is a scarce resource, there are 
alternative uses for forested land than merely allowing it to remain in its natural state. 
Each of these alternative uses is potentially more profitable, with three particular 
scenarios highlighted. One possibility, driven by rising incomes and the implied rise in 
the demand for property, is using the land for construction and development (e.g. 
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building vacation condos or accommodating urban sprawl). Rising property prices are 
likely to increase the profitability of such endeavors. The second alternative is planting 
crops on previously forested land, which results in increased revenue for farmers. In 
general, rising crop prices would likely encourage farmers to produce more (and with the 
world price of grain rising steadily over the last few years, there is no lack of incentive). 
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy might exacerbate the situation by encouraging 
larger farm size. Finally, harvesting the trees and selling them in the lumber market is 
another opportunity to earn income from the land, an opportunity whose appeal rises in 
tandem with rising timber prices.1  
However, forest protection laws forbid all three of the abovementioned economic 
pursuits. Regardless of different trends in forest ownership (most forests in Greece and 
Bulgaria are public, while Spain and Italy have predominantly privately-owned woods), 
legislation prohibits any cultivation, construction, or logging on all forested areas.2 Thus, 
the interested parties are likely to resort to arson as a way to circumvent forest protection 
laws. The perpetrators are not impeded by laws that forbid construction for a certain 
number of years on former forested areas, since weak law enforcement and corruption 
generally allows them to reclassify burned land as former farmland, which can then be 
used essentially for anything.3 This is especially the case in Greece, which lacks a 
                                                 
1
 A fourth incentive emerges from the literature review in the form of compensation to volunteer 
firefighters: the unemployed are motivated to start fires knowing that they will get paid to put them out. 
However, this explanation has several drawbacks. It does not fit well within the framework of land scarcity 
and alternative uses of land, it proved impossible to confirm whether similar compensation is provided 
outside of Italy or how much the compensation actually is, and the media failed to mention this possibility 
in its criticism. Thus, while unemployment is tested in the model, its importance is inferior to that of the 
price variables, which are the principal focus of this study. 
2
 Although very limited logging may be carried out in private forests with special permission from forest 
managing organs. 
3
 In the case of logging, it may seem illogical to wish to set fire to potential lumber. However, of primary 
interest here is a practice referred to as “salvage logging.” This is a scenario in which burned trees are 
 5 
comprehensive registry of forested land. In contrast, a Greenpeace study conducted in 
Spain concluded that arsonists were only a minority (The Economist, August 30, 2007). 
These conditions imply that, assuming an ability to control for all other factors that may 
affect forest fires, it would be possible to isolate the arson effect, which would be 
observed in significantly different coefficients for each of the two countries. 
The hypothesized economic incentives for forest arson are an application of Gary 
Becker’s rational choice model of criminal behavior as the theoretical framework of this 
study (Becker 1968). Becker’s model considers the criminal as a profit-maximizing 
individual who will only commit a crime (set off a fire) if the expected marginal utility is 
greater than zero. The study makes use of annual data for the time period 1991-2005 from 
a wide variety of sources including EuroStat, FAOStat, the ILO, and national banks. 
Thus, based on a sound theoretical model and eclectic data sources, and seeking to shed 
some light on a relatively unexplored topic, this paper seeks to determine whether it is 
possible to observe a positive relationship between the prices of land, timber, and 
agricultural products and the incidence of forest fires in a panel of southern European 
countries. The number of forest fires is regressed on the price variables while controlling 
for weather, law enforcement, macroeconomic conditions, tourism, and country fixed 
effects. The findings of this study are likely to have implications regarding the potential 
for certain types of legislation to create perverse incentives and how these can be 
corrected. 
II. Literature Review 
                                                                                                                                                 
harvested for lumber since only their bark has been affected by the fire, while the heart of the tree remains 
intact (Black 2007). For instance, Alexandrian et al (1999) attest to the existence of an economy based on 
the cutting and the marketing of burnt woods. Thus, by setting off a fire, loggers would have more trees to 
harvest, which translates into higher income.   
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In order to clarify the issue at stake, identify the relevant variables, and assess the 
possible implications of any results, a large variety of sources must be consulted. While 
articles from popular news sources (cited in the Introduction) serve as a starting point by 
introducing the idea of forest arson and the legal elements involved, scholarly literature 
on the topics of arson, forest fires, and the Mediterranean region is crucial. First, it is 
necessary to ascertain that a connection does, indeed, exist between arson and economic 
factors. Perhaps the keystone study on this topic is by Hershbarger and Miller (1978), 
who examine the impact of economic conditions on the incidence of arson. In testing the 
null hypothesis that no statistically significant relationship exists between the movement 
of selected economic variables and fire losses, they find a statistically significant 
relationship between arson losses and several of the economic indicators. The 
relationship is particularly strong (and positive) between arson and bankruptcy filings, as 
well as the federal budget surplus. While this study has provoked various critiques, such 
as Spillman and Zak’s (1979) claim that the relationship between the business cycle and 
incendiary activity is very weak, Murrey et al. (1992), in an updated economic arson 
model, confirms Hershbarger and Miller’s findings. Among the independent variables 
tested, forgery bond loss ratios, the yield on long-term treasury bonds, and Canada’s 
consumer price index are only a few of those that demonstrate a significant relationship 
with arson losses. 
Once a generic link between economics and arson has been confirmed, a closer 
look is taken at the specific phenomenon of forest fires. Various studies have sought to 
model the occurrence of woodland fires. Prestemon and Butry (2005) set up wildland 
arson as an autoregressive crime function. The authors succeed in modeling the 
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phenomenon in a way that accounts for temporal clustering, thus introducing annual 
variation in wildland arson, which may explain more accurately how arson is affected by 
variables that change slowly or that cannot be expressed precisely at the daily time scale. 
Keane et al. (2003) also try to model arson, but they do so through simulation, 
determining the relative importance of simulation time span, fire frequency parameters, 
and fire size parameters. In a curious small-scale project, Mees (1991) focuses on the 
phenomenon of arson weather, or the idea that as weather conditions raise the possibility 
of a forest fire, arsonists’ propensity to start them also rises. His findings may have 
implications for the results of this study, in that if arson is a fairly small-scale 
phenomenon, weather variables may pick up its contribution to forest fires, thus masking 
any existing significance. None of these studies, however, considers economic incentives 
for arson. 
Instead, a number of single-country case studies seeking to determine the causes 
of forest fires provide guidance regarding the profit incentive and the inclusion of certain 
variables in the supply model. Perhaps the case study most closely linked to the purpose 
of this paper is carried out by Arima et al. (2007) in the Brazilian Amazon. The authors 
use the prices of beef and soy as a predictor of forest fires, finding a significant positive 
relationship between the commodity prices and the incidence of fire. The results of their 
investigation indicate that commodity prices can, indeed, be an incentive for fire arson, 
thus justifying the inclusion of the price of wheat as an independent variable in the 
model.4 Pazienza and Beraldo (2004) examine the effects of forestry legislation on the 
frequency of fires in Southern Italy. Compensation schemes for volunteer firefighters and 
                                                 
4
 Surprisingly, temperature was not included as a control variable in the model, indicating that it does not 
significantly affect the incidence of Amazon fires. This has implications for the model of European forest 
arson, as will be illustrated further.  
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the mechanism for distribution of federal funds to local governments based on incidence 
of forest fires encourage the unemployed or local officials to undertake incendiary 
activities. The study’s findings of a significant, positive relationship between fires and 
unemployment demonstrate how legislation can provide perverse incentives for the 
setting off of forest fires and serve as the basis for the inclusion of unemployment in this 
model. Other studies yield a variety of results, from pointing to the burning of debris and 
incendiary activities as the primary causes of wildfires in Brazil (Soares et al. 2006), to 
indicating weather conditions as the main culprit in Poland (Ubysz et al. 2006), to 
promoting a theory of economically-motivated arson in a Mexican context (Aridjis 1998).  
In considering specifically the Mediterranean region, Alexandrian et al. (1999) 
focus on the causes of forest fires, highlighting that these are predominantly human-
induced rather than of natural origin. They argue that rising standards of living in the 
region are contributing to the growing incidence of woodland fires by spurring a transfer 
of population from rural to urban areas. This demographic change has resulted in a loss of 
inhabitants with a sense of responsibility for the forest and, more importantly, an increase 
in the amount of fuel,5 both of which imply a rise in the number and intensity of forest 
fires. The growth of per capita GDP is included in this investigation (with an expected 
positive sign) to reflect Alexandrian et al.’s claims. Velez (1990) further develops the 
theory of tourist presence in Mediterranean forests as a significant contributing factor to 
fires. He blames the carelessness of smokers and excursionists who light cooking fires, as 
well as a secondary effect of their presence: the burning of large quantities of solid waste 
                                                 
5
 The accumulation of fuel refers to the gradual build up of biomass on the forest floor due to stagnation in 
forest activity. The presence of such highly flammable material raises the probability of a fire.  
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left by tourists and other recreational users of forest areas. Thus, it appears to be 
necessary to control for camper presence in the model. 
Other studies related to the general topic of forest fires fall within the field of 
forensic economics, analyzing the costs, be they social or economic, of the burning of 
hundreds of hectares of forest. Ortuno-Perez and Martin-Fernandez (2004) explore the 
cost of forest fire in southern Spain, while Rella et al. (2005) investigate the economic 
impact of forest fires in Italy. Both investigations conclude that the costs of forest fires 
are enormous and show concern for the negative impact they have on frail domestic 
economies, which attests to the relevance of the current study. From the concern 
regarding costs stems the idea that fires must be prevented, but there exists a problem of 
who will bear the costs of prevention measures. Seemingly, they ought to be borne by the 
communities at risk – an idea that has spawned the trend of contingent valuation, or a sort 
of payment-in-kind measurement. This method has been applied to gauge communities’ 
willingness to pay for forest fire prevention. For example, Hung et al. (2007) apply this in 
a Vietnamese context and conclude that CVM is a much more effective manner of 
persuading villagers to pay for fire prevention efforts. Their work may delineate a 
potential route for future government action. 
All of the research outlined above, when grouped together, succeeds in portraying 
forest arson as an economic phenomenon. This study is unique in focusing precisely on 
the relation between prices of land, crops, and timber and the incidence of forest fires, 
something that has not been done before and that, if successfully modeled, may 
demonstrate a need for policy changes in forest fire prevention. 
III. Theoretical Model 
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The nature of arson as a voluntary, illegal activity calls for a rational choice 
model of criminal behavior. The first of two theoretical models that were considered in 
relation to this topic was developed by Ehrlich (1973) and assumes that the gains from 
illegal activity depend solely on the amount of time devoted to that activity. It seems 
hardly applicable in the case of forest arson, which is neither a time-intensive activity, 
nor one that can replace legal activity as a source of income in the long term. 
Furthermore, the gains from forest arson do not depend directly on the amount of time 
dedicated to it, but rather on changes in the relative profitability of alternative land use 
and the probability of getting away with the crime.  Arson, then, violates the basic 
assumptions of Ehrlich’s model. 
Hence, the preferred model is one developed by Gary Becker (1968) in which the 
arsonist is modeled as a utility-maximizing individual presented with the choice of 
whether or not to commit a crime. Economists generally agree that, when other variables 
are held constant, an increase in a person’s probability of conviction or punishment 
would generally decrease his likelihood of committing the crime. Conversely, an increase 
in the utility of the illegal act would make it more appealing to the individual and hence 
raise the probability of its execution. However, neither the gain, nor the punishment is 
certain (the arsonist may or may not get caught), which calls for a model that focuses on 
expected utility. Becker illustrates this algebraically as  
, 
where  is the individual’s income, monetary plus psychic, from an offense;  is his 
utility function;  is the monetary equivalent of the punishment; and  is the probability 
of conviction. By taking the partial derivatives with respect to or it can be seen that 
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an increase in either the probability of conviction or the cost of the penalty would 
decrease the marginal utility expected from committing the offence 
 
and  
 . 
In contrast, an increase in the income from engaging in the illegal activity ( ) would 
increase the expected marginal utility of the crime.  
Logically, an individual will only break the law if the expected marginal utility of 
doing so is greater than zero. Thus, the expected marginal utility of a crime determines 
the number of offences, allowing Becker to expresses the crime supply function (with  
as the number of offences an individual would commit) as 
, 
where  and retain their meaning from above, and is a variable representing all the 
other factors (income available in other activities, nuisance arrests, etc.) that are likely to 
influence the marginal utility of committing a crime. A change in any one of these is 
expected to result in a change in the number of offences carried out. For instance, an 
increase in the probability of conviction reduces the utility expected from the crime and 
thus reduces the number of crimes supplied 
. 
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In applying Becker’s theory to arson, the probability of conviction and its cost are 
grouped into a single variable – law enforcement – due to unavailability of data. The 
simplified model is expressed as 
, 
so that the expected utility of setting off a fire depends on the extent to which law 
enforcement, fpj, is likely to reduce the income, Yj, from the crime.6 Income itself consists 
of several components: the price of timber (PT), the price of land (PL), the price of wheat 
(PW), and unemployment (UE).7 Taking the partial derivatives of the altered equation, 
first with respect to income, then with respect to law enforcement,  illustrates that an 
increase in income (essentially, an increase in the profit incentive) raises the expected 
marginal utility of breaking the law 
, 
whereas an increase in fpj lowers it 
. 
 As in the generic crime scenario, an individual will only start a fire if the expected 
marginal utility of doing so relative to a change in any one of the income components is 
greater than zero. To illustrate,  
                                                 
6
 The law enforcement variable (an index of corruption in the actual model) cannot be subtracted directly 
from the income that could be generated by a fire. Rather, the equation is only meant to illustrate the idea 
that better law enforcement and stricter punishment detracts from the potential profits.  
7
 It is difficult to determine whether unemployment should be included in the income variable (Y) or 
grouped with the factors in u. While a greater number of unemployed implies more fires, being 
unemployed is not in and of itself a financial incentive to set off a fire. Rather, the incentive would be the 
actual compensation one would receive as a volunteer firefighter. Essentially, then, UE is included as a 
factor of income only in the theoretical sense; in terms of the actual modeling, this ‘classification’ is 
unimportant.  
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, 
for a change in the price of timber, but PT could just as easily be replaced by PL, PW, 
etc. Thus, a change in the incentive structure or in the potential of getting caught alters 
the likelihood that the law is broken. Essentially, the expected marginal utility of arson 
determines the number of fires supplied intentionally, allowing the total supply of forest 
fires (FF) to be modeled as 
FFj = f(Yj, fpj, uj), 
where uj stands for any factors that contribute to natural or accidental forest fires. Each of 
the variables in this model is then decomposed into its respective parts, so that the 
comprehensive supply model, derived largely from the media’s allegations and the 
literature review, becomes 
FF=f(PL, PT, PW, UE, LE, Precip, Temp, GDPgr, Tourism).  
The first four variables have already been described as the profit incentive to forest arson; 
LE stands for law enforcement, or the potential cost to the perpetrator; and the remaining 
pieces are all factors that must be controlled for. Precipitation and temperature seek to 
offset weather effects, GDP growth ought to control for demographic and social changes, 
as well as the accumulation of fuel in the woods, and accounting for tourism siphons out 
the fires started by negligent people in close proximity to forested areas. 8 This selection 
of variables, while perhaps not exhaustive, realistically allows us to measure the effect of 
the proposed incentives for arson while controlling for alternative causes of forest fires 
                                                 
8
 It has been suggested that the supply of forest fires might be represented by a kinked supply curve of 
sorts. Basically, in natural or accidental conditions, the supply of fires is vertical, but as the potential 
returns to arson rise, the supply begins to slope upward.  
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such as weather conditions and unintended human intervention. The following section 
addresses the variables in greater detail.  
IV. Model Variables and Data Sources9  
The intended dataset for this study included six southern European countries – 
Spain, Portugal, Italy, Bulgaria, France, and Greece – over a 15-year time period, 1991-
2005. These countries were originally selected because of their high incidence of forest 
fires,10 the similarity of their climates, and coordination of their forest protection 
regulation under the European Union’s Sixth Environment Action Program. 
Unfortunately, unavailability of data forced the exclusion of Portugal and France from 
the dataset and also limited the years with a complete set of observations to 
approximately 1995-2005. A table of summary statistics for this final dataset, categorized 
by country, is available in the Appendix (Table1).  
The dependent variable, forest fires, could have taken on one of several distinct 
forms: number of forest fires started, total acres burned, or percentage of forest burned 
(over a one year period). The first of those is the best one for the model, since, to the 
extent that fires are a function of arson, their number depends directly on the individual’s 
decision to start a fire, whereas he/she would have no control over the area burned. The 
number of fires is divided by the area of forested land in the country (measured in 
thousands of acres) and then scaled up by one hundred. Essentially, the final form of the 
depended variable is number of fires per one hundred thousand hectares of forested area, 
with country means that range from as low as 14 for Bulgaria to almost ten times more 
                                                 
9
 Italics mark the use of exact variable names (e.g. UE rather than unemployment rate).  
10
 A report on Wildfire 2007, the 4th International Wildfire Conference, explains that Spain, Portugal, Italy, 
France and Greece are worst affected due to their geographical position and climate conditions. They are 
the EU member states with the highest forest fire risk index, and where the largest amount of burnt 
forestland is recorded (Rego, May. 10, 2007). 
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for Spain. This variable exhibits a great deal of variation both over time and across 
countries. The source is the Timber Bulletin, an annual publication of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).  
The UNECE is also the source of data on one of the profit incentive variables: 
timber prices (Price Timber). These are calculated as a weighted average of the export 
prices per cubic meter of roundwood, plywood, and sawnwood – the three principal wood 
products of the panel countries – and then transformed from real dollar prices, to real 
Euro prices (UNECE).11 Much like the dependent variable, the price of timber exhibits a 
great deal of variation, with Italy having average prices approximately ten times greater 
than Bulgaria. Variations in the price of land (Chng Price Land) are captured in a 
variable that measures annual change in the real price of a square meter of residential 
property which is compiled from several different publications.  Data on Greece is from 
an OECD report on real estate price indexes (Eiglsperger 2006); statistics on Spain are 
from the Bank of Spain (Bank of Spain), Italian prices are published by Nomisma, an 
economic research institute (Nomisma); and the value of Bulgaria’s property is made 
available by the National Statistical Institute (NSI).12 The mean change in housing prices 
for Bulgaria stands out with its large magnitude and negative sign. This is largely the 
effect of hyperinflation and economic problems during the transition period. Next, 
producer wheat prices (Price Wheat) from the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization 
are used as a proxy for farmers’ profit incentive (FAOSTAT). Wheat was chosen because 
                                                 
11
 Since the Euro was only introduced in 1999, the Federal Reserve’s “Euro Community” exchange rate is 
used for data prior to that year. It forms a continuous series with the ensuing Euro exchange rate. In 
addition, although Bulgaria has a distinct national currency, it is pegged to the Euro (and previously the 
German mark), which makes the use of Euro prices suitable (FRED).  
12
 An alternative variable, the European Central Bank’s Residential Property Price Index for the Euro Area, 
was tried in the model, but it performed poorly, most likely due to its failure to capture fluctuations within 
each country. 
 16 
it is a principal crop grown in each of the countries in the model and enjoys steady 
demand.13 It was lagged in order to account for the seasonal nature of agriculture: 
arguably, a farmer cannot expand the area under cultivation until the next planting 
season.14 Lags of the other two price variables were also tried, but they proved to have 
less explanatory power than non-lagged values, which indicates that loggers and 
contractors are able to react to price changes quickly. Figure 3 graphs the prices of timber 
and wheat alongside the average number of forest fires in an effort to illustrate the 
fluctuations in all of them over time. The final variable related to economically motivated 
arson – unemployment (UE) – is reported as total, civilian unemployment rates from the 
International Labor Organization (ILO). The coefficients on all four of the variables just 
described are expected to have positive signs based on the profit-motivated arson theory.  
 The law enforcement variable is represented by Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which is reported on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 
indicating the lowest level of corruption and 10, the highest (Transparency 
International).15 The expected sign on the corruption index is positive, since higher levels 
of corruption arguably lower the costs of arson, raising the supply of fires. Several 
alternatives to the CPI were considered, such as number of crimes committed per capita 
and two of the World Bank’s aggregate governance indicators – control of corruption and 
government effectiveness – but none improved the explanatory capacity of the model. 
                                                 
13
 According to FAOSTAT, a producer price is “the amount receivable by the producer from the purchaser 
for a unit of a good or service produced as output minus any VAT, or similar deductible tax, invoiced to the 
purchaser” (FAOSTAT). Seemingly, this measure does not account for any subsidies.  
14
 Lags were also tried with the other two price variables, but  
15
 Normally, the scale goes the other way around: 1 is most corrupt, 10 is least corrupt. However, the 
measurement was “flipped” in order to make for easier interpretation of the coefficient. TI defines the CPI 
thus: “The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries in terms of the degree 
to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. It is a composite index, a 
poll of polls, drawing on corruption-related data from expert and business surveys carried out by a variety 
of independent and reputable institutions” (TI). 
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Although it is easy to note that Bulgaria, for instance, is more corrupt than Spain, CPI 
exhibits very little within-country variation (standard deviations ranging between .4 and 
1), which might deprive it of significant descriptive power.  
Turning to the accidental and natural factors, weather in the model is accounted 
for in two ways: a measure of precipitation (Precip), which is predicted negative, and a 
measure of temperature (Days80up), predicted positive. National meteorological 
institutes provide monthly precipitation data, with the precipitation variable an average of 
rainfall (in millimeters) over the three summer months – June, July, and August – in the 
most affected regions.16 Bulgaria is the country that receives the greatest amount of 
rainfall (50mm per month), which partially explains its significantly lower number of 
forest fires. The University of Dayton is the source of daily temperature data for each of 
the four countries, data which is converted into a variable indicating the number of days 
during which the country experienced temperatures above 80 degrees Fahrenheit over the 
four hottest months, June through September (U of Dayton). The temperature variable 
fares better in this particular format than as average temperature or maximum 
temperature, although Greece appears to have an unusually high number of hot days.17 
Real GDP per capita growth (GDPgr), made available by the USDA’s Economic 
Research Service, is expected to be positive for reasons laid out in the literature review, 
as well as on the assumption that economic growth is an indication of more development 
and construction, which raises the demand for land (USDA). Finally, tourism (Campers) 
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 For Spain, precipitation data was from Barcelona, Salamanca, Madrid, and Seville; for Italy, the 
Ciampino weather station, located in the middle of the peninsula; for Greece, Kalamata, Mikra, and 
Alexadroupoli; and for Bulgaria, Haskovo, Pleven, Pazardzhik, and Kazanlyk. These locations are marked 
with red dots on the map of forest fire risk in the Appendix.  
17
 An interaction variable between precipitation and temperature was also tried, since weather that is both 
hot and dry would likely result in more fires, but it was found to be insignificant.  
 18 
data comes from EUROSTAT – the European Union’s statistics database – and is 
calculated as the number of nights (in hundreds) spent by campers divided by the number 
of campsites (EUROSTAT). Essentially, it represents a density of campers in the woods 
and as such, the anticipated sign of its coefficient is positive, as greater human presence 
increases the chances of fires caused by negligence.  
V. Econometric Estimation 
When using panel data, the general expectation is that because of country-specific 
factors, the averages of the dependent variable (number of forest fires) are different for 
each cross-section unit (country) but the variance of the errors is not. Indeed, as can be 
seen from the summary statistics (Table1), there is significant variation in the mean 
number of fires. Spain, for instance, has roughly 140 forest fires annually per one 
hundred thousand hectares of forested land, in contrast to Bulgaria, which can expect less 
than 15. In contrast, the difference in the standard deviations is not nearly as pronounced 
(27 versus 12). Such peculiarities in the data tend to result in inconsistent coefficients on 
the independent variables with random effects estimation. The technique most commonly 
used to eliminate the inconsistency is fixed effects estimation. By creating country 
binaries and including them in an ordinary least squares model, country-specific 
characteristics are controlled for, leaving only time-dependent variation in the data. In 
order to avoid perfect multicollinearity, the country binary for Spain is left out of the 
estimation models. Thus, the coefficients on the other countries indicate how the number 
of forest fires in Italy, Greece, or Bulgaria compares to the number of fires in Spain.18  
                                                 
18
 At early stages of modeling, year binaries were also tried in an effort to control for year-specific 
idiosyncrasies, but they were found to be insignificant.  
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Expectations regarding the coefficient signs on these binaries are uncertain for 
several reasons. First of all, if the Greenpeace study carried out in Spain is correct in its 
conclusion that arson is not a significant cause of forest fires in the country then Spain 
should, arguably, have fewer fires than its Mediterranean neighbors if the model 
successfully controls for all other factors (positive signs on all three country binaries). 
Second, Greece’s lack of forest records presumably makes arson much easier to carry out 
and get away with, resulting in a greater incidence of fires in Greece (positive coefficient 
on country binary), other things held constant. Finally, Spain traditionally has suffered 
from more forest fires than any of the other countries, so if arson is too small of a 
phenomenon, the country binaries are not likely to reflect its impact unless all other 
causes are perfectly controlled for. Given this ambiguity, the significance of the binary 
variables is evaluated with a two-tailed test, while one-tailed tests are used for all other 
variables. 
The regression analysis begins with a very simple model, which includes only 
unemployment, GDP growth, precipitation, temperature, and campers. The profit 
incentive is added in the second model in the form of the three price variables. The 
Corruption Perceptions Index – the law enforcement factor – is included in the third 
regression. Adding the profit incentives and the potential cost of arson to the model at 
separate stages provides a better illustration of the impact of each than would be 
obtaining by testing an all-inclusive model from the very beginning. However, that 
benefit aside, the results of these three initial models are hardly relevant, since it is 
absolutely crucial that fixed effects be included. The fourth model does, indeed, contain 
the country binaries, and is the most comprehensive estimation possible. Finally, the 
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“best” model is chosen based on a combination of adjusted R-squared optimization, the 
strength of the theoretical justification for the inclusion of a variable, and the significance 
and sign of the coefficient. Standardized coefficients are calculated to demonstrate the 
relative importance of each independent variable in, while variance inflation factors are 
monitored to ensure that multicollinearity is not a problem.  
VI. Results and Interpretation 
 Table 2 displays the results of the five regressions, and it can be seen immediately 
that the first two models are very similar in their results. The variables account for 
approximately four-fifths of the variation in number of forest fires (the second model has 
a higher adjusted R-squared than the first model, indicating that including the profit 
incentive in the model improves it). Such high explanatory power initially seems 
spurious, but it is easily explained by the presence of a precipitation variable, which is the 
largest natural determinant of fires, as well the inclusion of a tourism statistic. This latter 
measure is highly correlated with the country binaries, meaning that because of their 
absence from the model, Campers picks up much of the country-specific significance. 
Indeed, the standardized coefficient (0.890 in the initial model, 0.817 in the second) on 
the variable is far too high to account only for negligent tourists’ contribution to forest 
fires. Aside from the tourism variable, the coefficients on GDP growth, unemployment, 
and weather have the expected sign and are significant at least at a 5% confidence level in 
the initial model and at least at 10% in the second one. However, only one of the price 
variables, the lagged price of wheat, is significant (at 5%) and of the correct sign. A 
negative sign on the price of timber contradicts expectations, but its lack of significance 
makes this less disconcerting. 
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 In the next step, the law enforcement variable, CPI, is added to the model. This is 
a variable with very little within-country variation (Table1 indicates that standard 
deviations range between .4 and 1 depending on the country). As such, it is highly 
correlated with several of the country binaries (thus picking up their effect) and with the 
tourism variable (itself highly dependent on country), which explains the appearance of 
multicollinearity in the model. CPI itself has a variance inflation factor slightly above 5 
(the usual cut-off point for economists), while a VIF surpassing 10 on the camper statistic 
indicates that multicollinearity is, indeed, a problem. GDP growth is stripped of its 
significance, as are temperature and the price of wheat, while the price of timber becomes 
borderline significant (10%) and positive. The unemployment rate and tourism remain as 
the strongest predictors of forest fires. Contrary to all expectations, the coefficient on the 
law enforcement variable has a negative significant sign, which indicates that as 
corruption increases, there are fewer fires. However, attempting to interpret this variable 
without controlling for country-specific effects reveals very little information. 
 When the model is finally run with fixed effects, the R-squared indicates that over 
90% of the variation in forest fires is now explained. The adjusted R-squared is also 
notably higher than that of the previous model. These measures are viable in spite of the 
severe multicollinearity (VIFs around 40 for Campers and Greece, notably above 5 for 
another six variables) that has appeared, since multicollinearity does not affect the overall 
reliability of the model but rather the accuracy of the individual coefficients.19 As could 
be anticipated based on their close association to the country variables, the tourism, 
unemployment, and corruption variables all lose their significance. GDP growth regains 
                                                 
19
 In case these are of interest, and seeing as they are not included in the results table: UE has a VIF slightly 
over 9, Days80up over 7, CPI close to 7, Price Timber around 8, and the remaining country binaries, over 
10.  
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it, remaining positive, as weather remains almost unchanged. Unfortunately, none of the 
price variables is significant, but the multicollinearity in the model might be partially 
responsible. All of the country binaries are negative and significant at least at 5%, which 
means that Italy, Greece, and Bulgaria all have fewer fires relative to Spain even after 
controlling for all of the profit-related, accidental, and natural causes of fires possible. 
This will be addressed in greater detail in section VII.  
 The last column in Table2 displays the results of the final, and preferred, model. 
While this model does have a lower R-squared and adjusted R-squared than the previous 
one, both measures are still very high, indicating that the model has considerable 
explanatory power and is better than the first three models.20 It also uses a greater number 
of observations – 49 as compared to 39 in the previous model. All of the variables 
removed are ones that were insignificant in the previous model, except for the price 
measures, which are retained as the focal point of this study. However, insignificance is 
not the only justification for the elimination of UE, Campers, CPI and Days80up. 
Perhaps the principal reason for the elimination of the first one was the impossibility of 
finding out whether or not the other three countries in the dataset have the same policies 
for the compensation of volunteer firefighters as Italy. Thus, if such legislation exists 
only in one small area, the unemployment rate is unlikely to have a large impact on the 
number of forest fires. Tourism was removed because it was not significant in any one of 
numerous fixed effects regressions, it was highly multicollinear with many of the 
variables, and its coefficient was of the wrong sign when controlling for fixed effects. 
                                                 
20
 Naturally, the 5 models included in the results table are only a small representation of the total number of 
regressions that have been run on the dataset. The ‘preferred’ model is better than many of them if adjusted 
R-squared is considered to be the only criterion. It is better than all of them if adj. R-squared is considered 
alongside theoretical justification and the simplicity principle.  
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While the theoretical justification for including it into the model might be strong, it 
appears that the variable itself fails to capture the desired tourist effect as increased 
presence of people in close proximity to forested lands. Corruption was discarded 
because not only does the index not offer significant within-country variation over time, 
but it might also be failing to capture the exact phenomenon of interest to this study. An 
optimal variable would have been percent convicted of forest arson out of total arrests for 
it, but such data is not publicly available. Finally, the absence of a temperature variable in 
the Pazienza and Beraldo study (2004) of Amazon fires, coupled with the generally 
moderate Mediterranean climate and the relatively larger contribution of other weather 
phenomena to forest fires are the reasons for the exclusion of the temperature variable.21  
Focusing on the results of this final regression, the only insignificant variable is 
the change in land prices, which has actually remained insignificant all along. Aside from 
the obvious explanation of property prices having no effect on the number of forest fires, 
other possibilities include the variable’s ineffectiveness as a proxy for the price of land 
that is likely to be a target for arson or the incomplete information given by a “change in 
price” variable rather than an actual measure of price. All of the other variables have the 
predicted sign and are significant at least at 10%. In comparing standardized coefficients, 
country has the largest impact, followed by the prices of wheat and timber, precipitation, 
and finally GDP growth. Multicollinearity is reduced significantly by taking out the 
abovementioned variables: it now only slightly (VIF of roughly 6.5) affects Italy and 
Price Timber, which is understandable since Italy is characterized by an unusually high 
price of timber relative to the other countries. In the interest of interpretation, it appears 
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 The insignificance of temperature makes sense. If the weather is hot but wet, the chances of fire are 
miniscule, but if conditions are extremely dry, a spark will set of a fire regardless of whether temperature is 
in the 60s, 70s, or anything over that.  
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that a one percent increase in GDP per capita growth results in over two additional fires 
annually; two additional millimeter of precipitation decrease the number of fires by one; 
a 100 euro increase in the price of timber leads to three additional fires; and a similar 
increase in the previous year’s price of wheat would increase the number of fires by 
almost 24. In terms of country binaries, other things held constant, Italy has 60 fewer 
fires than Spain, Greece – 95, and Bulgaria – 90. Overall, the model appears to be 
capturing the variation in number of forest fires quite well, while adhering to the basic 
economic principle of parsimony. 
VII. Discussion and Implications 
 Before the results of the study are evaluated, it ought to be noted that a bold 
assumption had to be made regarding the dependent variable. It is assumed that all forest 
fires are reported with equal accuracy and based on identical criteria as to what 
constitutes a forest fire in terms of magnitude and surrounding vegetation. However, 
although the data comes from a uniform source, it is reported to the UNECE by the 
individual countries. Differences in the accuracy of monitoring systems, in definitions of 
a forest fires, or in the presence (or absence) of incentives to report more fires or conceal 
a number of them could all affect the consistency of the data.  
Assuming the validity of the data, the fixed effects estimation of forest fires in 
southern Europe yields mixed results. On the one hand, there is strong evidence that 
human induced changes have an effect on the number of forest fires. This is seen in the 
positive, significant coefficient on GDP per capita growth, a coefficient which captures 
demographic relocation, incentives for development, and the accumulation of fuel.  It 
also appears that a profit incentive to arson does, indeed, exist and is manifested in the 
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positive, significant coefficients on the price of timber and price of wheat variables. 
However, in the absence of a law enforcement variable, these prices do not reflect the 
true expected returns from a forest fire. In addition, there may be alternative explanations 
for their significance which are not controlled for in the model. For instance, in the case 
of higher grain prices, farmers might be starting fires to clear land that is simply 
abandoned farmland in order to expand the total area they cultivate. If they lose control of 
the fire and it spreads to a nearby forest, that forest is, practically, the victim of economic 
incentive, but arson has no part in the scenario. Along the same lines, a rise in the price of 
timber would likely implicate increased activity in the logging industry, which raises the 
probability of accidental fires. On the flip side, if producer prices from the FAO do not 
account for subsidies, which are generous in the European Union, the price of wheat 
variable is unable to capture the profit motives in their entirety. Furthermore, ‘arson 
weather’ behavior (Mees 1991) might be masking the arson effect (which is relatively 
small to begin with), since weather variables such as precipitation would pick up most of 
the explanatory power.  
Another important consideration revolves around the significance of the country 
binaries, which include a variety of factors not controlled for in the model. One 
possibility is climate and geographical distinctions, such as the frequency of storms (that 
generate lightning, thus sparking fires), wind (which can carry sparks to new patches of 
forest), or the location of forests (how far removed are they from cities and human 
activity). Another potentially important factor is the amount of resources dedicated to 
forest protection and educational campaigns, which can directly decrease the number of 
fires. Finally, country binaries represent an aggregate of cultural factors that are 
 26 
impossible to isolate – mindsets, attitudes, peculiarities. Perhaps a certain culture has a 
stronger sense of responsibility for the state of the world’s forests or is less likely to 
throw a cigarette stub out the window. In the exclusion of the CPI, corruption is one of 
those ‘cultural’ factors. The fact that the coefficients on Italy, Greece, and Bulgaria are 
negative, indicating that all three countries have relatively fewer fires than Spain, could 
mean one of several things: first of all, the study that claims that most fires in Spain are 
not arson is wrong (the other countries are more corrupt, so they should have had a 
greater incidence of arson/fires); second, Greece’s lack of forestry records does not make 
it significantly easier to profit from arson than in the countries with forest records 
(otherwise Greece would have had a positive coefficient); finally (and most likely), the 
incidence of arson is too small to capture without a very precise model. Since the country 
binaries carry so much other information, it is very likely that the arson phenomenon is 
not pronounced enough to alter the overall country effect.  
However, since there is some evidence as to the connection between economic 
incentives and forest fires, this might have implications for government policy regarding 
forest regulation. One approach would be for governments to bolster their law 
enforcement efforts for the protection of forested areas by increasing monitoring and the 
severity of punishment. An alternative approach would be to adopt positive incentives. 
Ehrlich (1996) argues in favor of a similar course of action, arguing that decreasing the 
disparity between potential profits from legal and illegal activities can be an effective 
deterrent of crime. Thus, a program offering subsidies to property owners for the 
maintenance of their forests in a healthy condition may be an effective solution. Indeed, 
Mayer and Tikka (2006) investigate similar initiatives in North America and several 
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northern European countries and find that an incentive-based approach is effective in 
maintaining biodiversity in privately owned forests.22 Whichever approach is chosen, 
policymakers must be aware of the potential consequences of their actions, of the 
possible adverse incentives certain forms of legislation might be creating.  
VIII. Conclusion 
 
It ought to be conceded that this study leaves many questions unanswered. While 
human actions clearly affect the number of forest fires, there is little certainty as to the 
exact motivation (legal or illegal, accidental or intentional). The interpretation of country-
specific effects is complicated by the comprehensive nature of the country binaries. 
Essentially, the study leaves abundant room for further investigation: expanding the data 
set to include Portugal, France, and perhaps Turkey, as well as a greater number of years; 
fine-tuning some of the independent variables, particularly in terms of prices; collecting 
data on expenditure for forest protection; and investigating the impact of EU agricultural 
subsidies on forest fires.  
However, one thing is undeniable: forest fires deserve the attention of scholars, 
policymakers, and the public worldwide. They are a devastating force that annually 
annihilates millions of trees, releases tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, and 
destroys hundreds of thousands of euro of private property in the countries of southern 
Europe (as well as around the world). The fixed effects estimation undertaken in this 
study indicates that humans are responsible for more damages than can be offset by 
natural factors such as precipitation. Thus, it is every government and every individual’s 
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 According to another study, another possible course of action is to encourage cooperation between small 
forest owners: “Twelve countries reported that the fragmentation of private holdings represents a hindrance 
to sustainable forest management. Small-scale owners may find it more difficult to draw profits than larger 
entities, and transfer of knowledge and access to infrastructure can be complicated when owners are many. 
Local and regional cooperation among owners is thus crucial.” 
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responsibility to ensure the adoption of measures to prevent forest fires resulting from 
negligence, deter arsonists through better law enforcement and positive incentives, and 
improve the efficiency of firefighting techniques. Keeping in mind the importance of the 
Mediterranean forests for biodiversity and the rising threat of global warming, it is 
imperative that humans cease to exacerbate a phenomenon that is already so destructive 
in its natural state and work to diminish its deleterious effects. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Number of Hot Spots* Detected in Mediterranean Countries 
(1996-2007) 
 
 
* A hotspot is a mark on an infrared satellite image indicating a heat source typical of 
burning vegetation. 
Source: ATSR World Fire Atlas 
http://dup.esrin.esa.int/ionia/wfa/index.asp 
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Figure 2: Mapping Levels of Forest Fire Hazard 
(Based on: forest fire data for the period 1997-2003 and biogeographic factors)  
 
 
Source: ESPON (European Spatial Observation Network) Data Base, 2005 
  http://www.gtk.fi/projects/espon/ForestFires_files/image002.jpg 
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Figure 3: Time Trends in 4-Country Average Prices and Number of Fires 
(1991-2005) 
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics for Model Variables 
(1991-2005)* 
 
 
Spain Italy Greece Bulgaria 
 
Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Fires 
138.26 
(27.03) 
96.96 
(30.27) 
50.30 
(15.18) 
14.31 
(11.96) 
GDPgr 
2.85 
(1.93) 
1.15 
(1.07) 
2.51 
(1.85) 
1.76 
(5.43) 
UE 
16.60 
(5.13) 
10.23 
(1.36) 
9.97 
(1.00) 
15.36 
(3.41) 
Timber Price 
228.06 
(81.15) 
871.10 
(223.09) 
231.72 
(118.57) 
77.30 
(36.35) 
Price Land (∆) 
8.36 
(7.44) 
1.87 
(6.19) 
9.58 
(3.99) 
-34.04 
(137.17) 
Price Wheat 
157.36 
(25.89) 
183.14 
(32.31) 
185.64 
(41.39) 
80.91 
(29.23) 
Campers 
82.03 
(28.86) 
94.18 
(17.73) 
21.20 
(3.86) 
26.46 
(12.28) 
Days80up 
10.36 
(18.73) 
5.27 
(8.92) 
62.09 
(7.16) 
1.90 
(2.51) 
Precipitation 
15.98 
(10.19) 
30.27 
(23.24) 
17.07 
(8.69) 
52.31 
(26.25) 
CPI 
3.69 
(1.06) 
5.35 
(.78) 
5.43 
(.43) 
6.30 
(.42) 
*For certain variables, the available data does not span the entire period. Days80up and 
CPI are limited to 1995-2005. 
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TABLE 2: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results: With and Without Fixed 
Effects Estimationa 
 
Dependent Variable = Number of Fires per 100,000 Hectares of Forest 
 
Variableb 
Basic 
Model With Prices With CPI 
Fixed 
Effects 
"Best" 
Model 
 
     
R-squared 0.7947 0.8309 0.8571 0.9282 0.8803 
Adj. R-squared 0.7677 0.7899 0.8127 0.8951 0.8564 
n 44 42 39 39 49 
      
Interceptc -84.041** -108.068*** -35.411 163.581* 93.872*** 
 (-2.69) (-3.56) (-0.50) (2.06) (5.28) 
 
     
GDPGr (+)d 4.301*** 3.458** 2.956 4.847** 2.355** 
 0.221 0.188 0.112 0.183 0.124 
 (2.88) (2.26) (0.88) (1.75) (1.92) 
 
     
UE (+) 6.097*** 6.297*** 7.489*** 0.217  
 0.424 0.455 0.575 0.017  
 (4.47) (4.59) (5.08) (0.10)  
 
     
Precip (-) -0.559*** -.485** -0.421** -0.250* -0.425*** 
 -0.261 -0.237 -0.214 -0.127 -0.198 
 (-2.60) (-2.41) (-2.20) (-1.63) (-2.72) 
 
     
Days80up (+) 0.581** 0.356* 0.227 0.050  
 0.295 1.33 0.125 0.027  
 (2.29) (0.187) (0.85) (0.19)  
 
     
Campers (+) 1.193*** 1.071*** 0.626** -0.346  
 0.890 0.817 0.508 -0.281  
 (7.98) (6.70) (2.25) (-0.86)  
 
     
Price Timber (+) 
 -0.009 0.034* 0.017 0.032* 
 
 -0.059 0.230 0.117 0.217 
 
 (-0.57) (1.65) 0.77 (1.56) 
 
     
Chng Price Land (+) 
 0.038 0.600 -0.451 -0.012 
 
 0.054 0.124 -0.093 -0.016 
 
 (0.67) (1.21) -0.95 (-0.26) 
 
     
Lag(Price Wheat) (+) 
 0.240** 0.179 0.134 0.238** 
 
 0.200 0.137 0.102 0.220 
 
 (2.06) (1.26) 0.95 (2.32) 
 
     
CPI (+) 
  -13.086** -6.084  
 
  -0.304 -0.141  
 
  (-1.89) -1.02  
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Italy (?) 
   -48.552** -59.750*** 
 
   -0.444 -0.523 
 
   -2.36 (-3.72) 
 
     
Greece (?) 
   -114.814*** -95.413*** 
 
   -1.018 -0.745 
 
   -2.92 (-11.04) 
 
     
Bulgaria (?) 
   -127.420*** -89.353*** 
 
   -1.044 -0.744 
 
   
-4.36 (-6.68) 
a. The layout of results for each variable is Coefficient, Standardized Coefficient, (t-value). 
b. Significance at 1% is reported as ***, 5% as **, and 10% as *. 
c. All tests are one-tailed except for country binaries.  
d. The sign in parentheses immediately following the variable name is the anticipated sign of the 
coefficient.  
